From: | Stéphane Sérafin <Stephane.Serafin@uottawa.ca> |
To: | Obligations <obligations@uwo.ca> |
Date: | 26/06/2020 17:41:52 UTC |
Subject: | RE: Supreme Court of Canada on Unconscionability in Contract |
Yet Justice Brown at least attempts to outline what the distinction between public policy and unconscionability might be, by contrast with the majority which, on a cursory reading, appears to take
us further down the road taken in Douez by subsuming public policy under equitable considerations. Frankly, this strikes me as a victory of sorts for proponents of (near-)absolute freedom of contract.
From: Jack Enman-Beech <jenmanbeech@gmail.com>
Sent: June 26, 2020 1:17 PM
Cc: Obligations <obligations@uwo.ca>
Subject: Re: Supreme Court of Canada on Unconscionability in Contract
Attention : courriel externe | external email
As when a gang uses high pressure door-to-door sales tactics to push its protection racket—the resulting agreements are likely to be both inequitable and against public policy.
The case was argued on unconscionability grounds probably for pragmatic reasons: unconscionability is relatively developed in Canadian law and commentary. Arguing for a public policy ensuring access to courts would have seemed riskier, particularly in the
face of legislative support for arbitration. Academic support for such a public policy approach might have forestalled the extension of unconscionability. Justice Brown had almost no scholarship to cite in support of his public policy position, while the majority
sees its unconscionability arguments reflected in work by most of the leading Canadian contract scholars.
Jack Enman-Beech
SJD Candidate, University of Toronto Faculty of Law